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ReviewDecisions, Decisions, Decisions:
Choosing a Biological Science of Choice
nally designed...the theory requires that the values of
different outcomes (for example, financial rewards, the
risks of death and the pleasures of a clear conscience)
Paul W. Glimcher1
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New York University
might be measured on a single scale. In human applica-New York, New York 10003
tions this measure is provided by ‘utility’—a somewhat
artificial and uncomfortable concept: In biology, Darwin-
ian fitness provides a natural and genuinely one-dimen-Behavioral ecologists argue that evolution drives ani-
sional scale.”mal behavior to efficiently solve the problems animals
By anchoring economic theory to Darwinian notions offace in their environmental niches. The ultimate evolu-
fitness, these behavioral ecologists undertook to explaintionary causes of decision making, they contend, can
the ultimate causes of human and animal behavior.be found in economic analyses of organisms and their
Whether a moose decides to eat algae or grass on aenvironments. Neurobiologists interested in how ani-
particular day (Belovsky, 1984), with whom a monkeymals make decisons have, in contrast, focused their
decides to mate (Dunbar, 1984), or whether a youngefforts on understanding the neurobiological hard-
salmon decides to forage or hide (Bull et al., 1996) canware that serves as a more proximal cause of that
all, these scientists contend, be viewed as decisionssame behavior. Describing the flow of information
which are the products of evolution acting to maximizewithin the nervous system without regard to these
fitness in the face of uncertainty. Behavioral ecologistslarger goals has been their focus. Recent work in a
explain behavior in evolutionary terms by quantitativelynumber of laboratories has begun to suggest that
analyzing the decisions animals make and correlatingthese two approaches are beginning to fuse. It may
the outcomes of those decisions with theoretical or em-soon be possible to view the nervous system as a
pirical measurements of fitness. Their goal is to relaterepresentational process that solves the mathemati-
a theoretical assessment of what an animal should docally defined economic problems animals face by
with behavioral data about what animals actually do.making efficient decisions. These developments in the
They try to understand what causes a behavior by under-neurobiological theory of choice, and the new schema
standing the evolutionary constraints under which thatthey imply, form the subject of this article.
behavior evolved.
In contrast, neurobiologists devote their resources toIntroduction
understanding what causes behavior to occur in a moreIn the 1650s, Blaise Pascal puzzled over one of the most
proximal sense. Neurobiologists seek to understand thecomplicated decisions faced by enlightenment philoso-
mechanistic cellular processes by which the brain pro-phers: “Either God is or he is not,” he wrote. “But to
duces specific behavioral acts. They seek to understandwhich view shall we be inclined?” Pascal took what
how a cue light causes a rat to press a lever for foodwas then a completely novel approach to this problem,
or how a visual target presented to a monkey elicitsarguing that one should “weigh up the gain and loss
an eye movement; neurophysiologists have sought toinvolved in calling heads that God exists” or tails that
understand what causes a behavior by studying thehe does not (Pascal, 1670).
sensory-motor architecture of the brain.Over the ensuing three centuries, Pascal’s notion that
The existence of these parallel approaches to un-gain and uncertainty must interact whenever rational
derstanding behavior raises an interesting and oftendecision making occurs has become the foundation for
overlooked question. What is the relationship between
all rigorous analysis of human choice behavior. Modern
ultimate and proximal causation in behavior? While evo-
economic theory rests almost entirely upon this idea.
lution may shape behaviors toward efficient forms, the
Some thinkers, however, have criticized Pascal’s ap- specific environmental variables which guide evolution
proach, and in particular its use to characterize financial may not be represented explicitly by the neural architec-
decision making, as unsystematic. These scientists ture evolution produces. There may be little reason to
have noted that while uncertainty can be rigorously believe that the computations which influence fitness at
quantified with tools like Bayesian Estimation, under- an evolutionary level are echoed by the computations
standing the subjective value of a financial gain or a made within the brains of individual animals. In the last
loss in mathematical terms may be impossible (for a decade, however, evidence has been accumulating that
review of these criticisms, see Glimcher, 2003). Re- the brains of complex animals like mammals perform
cently, however, a group of biologists has argued that operations which closely correspond to the optimization
economic approaches applied to biological questions problems behavioral ecologists describe as the ultimate
might overcome this limitation by relying on an alterna- causes of behavior. These data suggest that the environ-
tive system of valuation rooted in evolutionary theory. mental problems animals face may shape not only be-
“Paradoxically,” John Maynard Smith wrote in 1982, “it havior but also the neural hardware that generates that
has turned out that game theory [a branch of modern behavior. If this is widely true, then it may be of tremen-
economic theory] is more readily applied to biology than dous importance to neurophysiologists. The studies of
to the field of economic behavior for which it was origi- behavioral ecologists may define the computations per-
formed by the primate neurophysiological architecture
for decision making just as mathematical studies of im-1Correspondence: glimcher@cns.nyu.edu
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age encoding shaped our understanding of sensory en- The Prey Model
coding in the last century. This article reviews some of The first step in looking for food is to begin searching;
the growing evidence that economic analyses of behav- defined as any activity that takes time and during which
ior may provide neurobiologists with critical information, the forager may encounter prey. Searching is presumed
not just about what problems animals face, but about to cost s units of energy per minute, and animals engage
how their brains solve those problems. in search for a total time labeled Ts. After a period of
searching, it is assumed that the animal encounters a
Ultimate and Proximal Causes of Decision: prey item. The forager then has to make the decision
Static Conditions around which the prey model is structured, whether to
In 1966, The American Naturalist published two papers use both time and energy to attempt to capture and eat
that, although there were important precedents (cf. Hol- the prey item or whether to pass it up and continue
ling, 1959), largely invented quantitative behavioral ecol- searching. The process of predating is thus a cycle:
ogy. J. Merritt Emlen writing alone (Emlen, 1966) and search, encounter, decide, search, encounter, decide...
Robert MacArthur writing with Eric Pianka suggested The goal of the model is to characterize the decision-
that whenever an animal must make a decision about making phase, for which the animal must know (1) the
what food to eat it faces an optimization problem that energy gained from prey of each type, (2) the average
can be quantified and solved in economic terms. Evolu- handling time required to catch and consume the prey,
tion, they suggested, could be viewed as a force that (3) the cost, in energy spent, of the handling process,
might well drive organisms not just to solve these prob- and (4) the rate, in encounters per unit time, at which a
lems but to solve them efficiently. “There is a close prey of each type is detected.
parallel between the development of theories in eco- We can characterize the rate of net energy intake
nomics and population biology. In biology, however, the in any environment and for any possible prey attack
geometry of the organisms and their environment plays strategy in the following way. First, we determine the
a greater role. Different phenotypes have different abili- profitability of each prey type by multiplying the proba-
ties at harvesting resources, and the resources are dis- bility that the forager will attack that prey type, P (the
tributed in a patchwork in three dimensions in the envi- variable controlled by the forager), by the frequency with
ronment. In this paper we undertake to determine in which that prey is encountered, , to determine how
which patches a species would feed and which items often an attack occurs. Then multiply that frequency by
would form its diet if the species acted in the most the net energy gained from the prey. (The value of the
economical fashion. Hopefully, natural selection will of- prey minus the energy lost during handling.) This calcu-
ten have achieved such optimal allocation of time and lation tells us how much energy the forager can expect
energy expenditures, but such ‘optimum theories’ are to gain (per unit time) for adopting this probability of
hypotheses for testing rather than anything certain” attack with this particular type of prey.
(MacArthur and Pianka, 1966).
The area of behavioral ecology which developed di- average gain per prey type per unit time
rectly from these two papers, foraging theory, has made
 P    (energy gained  energy lost) (1)significant advances since 1966, and today, at least six
independent optimization problems have been identi-
Next, one needs to know the cost of attacking each typefied, modeled, and tested. One class of foraging problem
of prey in terms of time diverted away from searchingthat has received significant attention, and one of partic-
for other, potentially better, prey items. Multiply theular relevance to neurobiologists, is the study of Prey
probability of an attack by the frequency of an encounterSelection. As a monkey roams the savannah, it encoun-
and by the total handling time for that prey type.ters patches of food of different types and qualities,
each with a different frequency. Each food type, a plant
average handling time per prey type
with nutritious roots, a colony of insects, or a piece of
fruit, occurs with a certain probability and a certain calo-  P    (handling time) (2)
ric density. Each takes a different amount of time and
Finally, one sums the first calculation across every pos-energy to obtain and consume, and so each has a differ-
sible prey type and multiplies it by the total time spentent value, or profitability, to the monkey. What happens
searching, then subtracts from that the total cost ofwhen a monkey like this encounters eight food patches,
searching, s, and divides the sum by the time spenteach with a different set of sensory properties? Those
sensory properties allow the animal to estimate the value searching plus handling, yielding a measure of how
of each patch, the cost of harvesting each patch, and much energy is gained, for a given set of attack strate-
the frequency with which a patch of that type is encoun- gies, per unit time.
tered. Prey selection models use these variables to pre-
dict which patch, if any, the monkey will attempt to R 
Ts[ average gain per prey type  s]
Ts   average handling time
(3)
acquire and consume. In complete mathematical form,
the prey model was therefore developed (Charnov, 1973;
To figure out directly what specific attack strategy maxi-Stephens and Krebs, 1986) to define a method for com-
mizes the rate of energy intake, one differentiates Equa-puting the most efficient predatory strategy for any ani-
tion 3 with regard to P, creating a new equation thatmal, in any environment. It assumes that optimal pre-
allows us to compute the set of attack strategies thatdation is achieved whenever a forager achieves a
maximizes R (for details, see Stephens and Krebs, 1986).maximum rate of energy intake with a minimal expendi-
ture of effort in a random and unpredictable world. The prey model thus defines an optimal strategy for
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the trial ended. If he looked at the oddball, he received
a drop of fruit juice as a reward.
Under conditions like these, we know quite a lot about
both the sensory and motor processes that must be-
come active in the monkey’s brain. When the targets
illuminate, we know that eight locations in the visual
cortices become active. These signals propagate
through the visual system toward saccadic eye move-
ment control centers like the frontal eye fields (FEF)
and the superior colliculus (SC). Only one of the eight
locations, however, represents the oddball and ulti-
mately leads to activation of the eye movement control
circuitry in those areas. So how is the translation from
eight visual signals to one motor command actually ac-
complished? To answer that question, Schall and hisFigure 1. Sensory-to-Motor Connectivity in Visual-Saccadic Deci-
colleagues recorded the activity of neurons in the sac-sion Making
cadic movement maps of the FEF while monkeys per-Visual signals originating in the retina pass via the lateral geniculate
formed this oddball detection task.nucleus of the thalamus to the visual cortices, the primary visual
cortex, and then throughout the extrastriate visual areas. These Whenever monkeys executed hundreds of these odd-
signals influence activity in saccadic control areas via the lateral ball detection trials, Schall noticed that there was a
intraparietal area, the frontal eye field, and even the superior collicu- natural variability in the speed with which the monkeys
lus. The two principal saccadic control areas, the superior colliculus
produced their saccades. Based on this behavioral vari-and the frontal eye fields, project in turn to areas in the brainstem
ability, trials could be divided into fast, medium, andreticular formation that control the speed and position of the rotating
slow groups. Examining the activity of FEF neurons oneyeball. (For a review of saccadic anatomy, see Glimcher, 1999.)
these trials, they found that each neuron was most active
before a movement in a particular direction, that neu-
ron’s best movement. Taking into account both the be-predation, a behavioral pattern toward which evolution
havioral and neurophysiological data, trials could beis presumed to drive real species.
subdivided into those in which the movement acquiringNeurophysiological Studies of Decision Making
the oddball was the best movement for the neuron beingWhile neurophysiologists have started to examine the
studied and those trials on which the oddball elicited aproximal causes of behaviors very much like those pro-
different movement.duced by a foraging monkey, they have tended to focus
Schall found that FEF neurons (Figure 2) rose to analmost exclusively on the neural pathways that link sen-
early peak firing rate shortly after stimulus onset, butsory stimuli, like the color of a food patch, with move-
only after about 80 ms was there evidence, in thesement control pathways, like those that activate the mus-
neurons, of an underlying decision process. At that
cles of the arm. Very little attention has been paid to
point, neuronal firing rates continued to grow if the best
the variables behavioral ecologists study. In part, this
movement for the studied neuron was required to look at
reflects the current state of our neurobiological sophisti-
the oddball; otherwise, firing rates dropped back toward
cation; both sensory systems and movement control baseline levels. Importantly, regardless of the rate of
systems are far better understood than the systems increase in neuronal activity, the movement occurred at
which assess the values, likelihoods, and profitabilities a roughly fixed interval after the firing rate reached a
of outcomes. But as a result, many classical physiologi- specific level. This led Schall to suggest the existence
cal studies have almost entirely ignored the variables of a decisional threshold which the rising activity had
behavioral ecologists identify as critical at the level of to cross in order for a movement to be produced.
ultimate causation. If the vertebrate brain does repre- Ecological Studies of Decision Making
sent the environmental variables that define strategies While these experiments do tell us something important
for maximizing evolutionary fitness, then these more about the relationship between sensation and action in
classical studies of sensory-to-motor connections may the primate nervous system, what is most striking to a
only reveal the most superficial properties of the neural behavioral ecologist is that almost none of the variables
architecture for decision making (Figure 1). which guide decision making were manipulated in those
In order to better understand how physiological stud- studies. The values, costs, profitability, and likelihoods
ies of decision making differ from ecological studies of of reward associated with stimulus and movement were
decision making, consider the following set of landmark not varied; instead, all of those variables were held con-
experiments by Jeffrey Schall and his colleagues (cf. stant under all conditions. As a result, to a behavioral
Hanes and Schall, 1996; Schall and Thompson, 1999). ecologist these experiments seem more about move-
For these experiments, thirsty rhesus monkeys were ment production than about decision making per se.
trained to stare straight ahead at a centrally located To more completely understand this point of view,
fixation stimulus. Shortly after the monkey began staring consider a classic ecological study of decision making
straight ahead, eight secondary targets appeared, ar- by John Krebs and his colleagues (Krebs et al., 1977).
ranged radially around the central fixation stimulus. In Krebs’ experiment (Figure 3), at the beginning of an
Seven of those targets appeared in a common color, experimental session, hungry titmice, a small European
and one appeared in a different color, an oddball. If the bird in the chickadee family, were placed in a 1 m3 cage.
The floor of the cage was opaque except for a 2.5 inchanimal looked at any of the seven common color targets,
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Figure 2. Oddball Task with Schall Activity Plot
In Schall’s oddball task, eight radially ar-
ranged targets appear simultaneously, one in
an oddball color.The animal receives a re-
ward if he looks at the oddball immediately
after it appears. When the oddball elicits a
movement encoded by the frontal eye field
neuron under study (the best movement), fir-
ing rates are different than when any other
movement is elicited. The difference between
these two firing patterns is apparent about
80 ms after target onset. Current evidence
suggests that this difference reflects a neu-
ronal decision about what movement to
produce.
hole, placed beneath a perch, which overlooked a black individual. Because some birds were able to strip the
paper tape off more quickly than others, the profitabilityrubber conveyor belt sliding past the opening at a speed
of the small worms varied significantly from individualof 5 inches per second. Out of sight of the bird, the
to individual. Third, the experimenters systematicallyexperimenters could place mealworms (a favorite food
manipulated the frequency with which, in a given experi-of titmice) on the belt, which would present the worms
mental session, worms of each type were encountered.to the birds through the 2.5 inch hole for about 0.5 s.
In each session, large and small worms were placed onThe birds had to decide whether to grab a worm as it
the conveyor belt according to a predetermined pseudo-went by or whether to wait for the next worm to appear.
random sequence yielding a specific mean encounterIn order to characterize the serial decision problem
frequency for that prey type. Varying the encounter fre-that the birds faced in terms of the classical prey selec-
quency was selected because under these circum-tion model (Charnov, 1973; see Stephens and Krebs,
stances the prey selection model makes a critical pre-1986, for a full treatment of the model), three classes of
diction. It predicts that for a given bird the average ratevariables were systematically manipulated in this study.
at which large worms are encountered should set aFirst, the caloric value of the mealworms was controlled.
minimum threshold for profitability. Any prey that fallsWorms were presented in two sizes which differed in
beneath this threshold should never be selected, regard-value by a factor of two. Second, the handling time (and
less of the frequency with which it is encountered (cf.thus the cost) associated with each worm type was
Stephens and Krebs, 1986).measured for each individual bird and, in the case of
When the experiment was run, the actual choicesthe small worms, was manipulated. This was accom-
made by each bird were well predicted by the preyplished by attaching pieces of paper tape to the small
selection model. For birds who could strip the tape awayworms, which the birds had to remove. By measuring
quickly, the model predicted that the small wormsthe time it took each individual to handle and consume
should always be above the threshold of profitability.both large and small worms, it was possible to determine
For the birds that handled the small worms slowly, how-the relative profitability of the two worm types to each
ever, the prey model made a different prediction. At
one or more of the rates at which large worms were
presented, each of these birds should have decided to
select only the large worms and to ignore the small
worms. What Krebs and his colleagues found was that
the choice behavior of the birds did reveal the existence
of this profitability threshold and at a level that was
almost identical to the level predicted by the model.
They also, however, observed one significant deviation
of behavior from the model. Although the birds showed
strong preferences for the large worms at the right times,
they did not show an absolute preference. When they
should have been ignoring the small worms completely,
they were still sampling those worms about 10% of the
time, a result which has been widely repeated but neverFigure 3. Krebs Experiment: Bird Foraging over Conveyor Belt
entirely explained.In Krebs’ experiment, hungry birds of the species parus major stand
In 1966, MacArthur and Pianka wrote that “‘optimumover a conveyor belt. An experimenter places mealworm segments
theories’” [which describe behavior as the product ofof two sizes on the belt in a pseudorandom sequence. The bird
faces a serial decision problem; it must decide which segments to evolution and the environment] are hypotheses for test-
eat and which to ignore. The decisions the bird makes are influenced ing rather than anything certain.” Recent tests of these
by the mean rates at which both prey types are encountered, the hypotheses, like the one conducted by Krebs and his
difficulty of capturing and eating the segments, and the relative
colleagues, suggest that economic approaches may of-values of the two different size pieces. Charnov’s prey model pre-
ten describe both behavior and the environmental vari-dicts the quantitative pattern of decisions that birds make with sig-
ables that shape it quite accurately (Krebs and Davies,nificant precision. Illustration from Glimcher, 2003, courtesy of MIT
Press. 1997). Neurophysiological studies of decision making,
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however, have until recently almost completely ignored a reward than the left lever. Under these conditions, the
animal should now switch to the right lever.these variables as tools for understanding the nervous
system. Of course, the notion that optimum theories of In the more general case, where the values of the
reward produced by the two levers varies, foraging theo-the type MacArthur and Pianka pioneered can be used
to study the neural architecture for decision making is ries predict that response rates on each lever should
be proportional to their relative profitabilities. If one ofmore a hypothesis for testing rather than anything cer-
tain. But a number of laboratories have begun to perform the two levers presents a standard reward and the other
presents a reward that is varied across blocks of trials,those tests, and the results are encouraging.
Decision Variables and Neural Architectures then it should be possible to determine the precise value
of any physiological stimulation to the rat with regardC. Randy Gallistel and his colleagues have spent over
20 years studying the decisions rats make when they to a fixed standard by observing the fraction of time she
budgets to each lever.work for brain stimulation reward, the direct electrical
activation of neural structures like the medial forebrain When Gallistel and his colleagues examined this two-
lever variable interval schedule with self-stimulation asbundle (MFB) with surgically implanted electrodes (cf.
Gallistel et al., 1981; Gallistel, 1994). Unlike ecological the reward, they were able to apply an economic-style
analysis to the choices rats made in order to describestudies in which rewards are experienced through intact
perceptual systems, experiments with brain stimulation the precise subjective profitability of any pattern of MFB
activation. This allowed them to derive an equation de-reward bypass at least some of the sensory component
of standard sensory-motor decision making. These stud- fining the value of stimulation as a function of the current,
frequency, and duration of MFB stimulation. Gallistel’sies therefore permit one to test the hypothesis that vari-
ables which serve as the ultimate causes of behavior results are critical because they were among the first
to suggest that economic-style approaches could becan govern the decisions made by a reduced segment
of the neural architecture, shifting the focus of the eco- used to study neurobiological phenomena. They show
that economic approaches can be used to characterizenomic approach toward a study of the proximal causes
of behavior. decision making not just at the level of the whole organ-
ism, but even when the sensory-perceptual systems byGallistel’s most recent work along these lines (cf. Leon
and Gallistel, 1992; Mark and Gallistel, 1993, 1994) has which the animal assesses natural rewards are replaced
by the direct electrical activation of an internal neuralfocused on the study of rats who must choose between
two different patterns of stimulation. In those experi- structure. If the approaches behavioral ecologists em-
ploy for studying the ultimate causes of behavior canments, a rat is placed in a cage that contains two levers.
If the rat depresses the right lever, the MFB is activated be used to study electrical stimulation of the MFB, can
these approaches also be used in neurophysiologicalby a brief train of electrical pulses delivered at a fixed
frequency and current. If the rat depresses the left lever, studies of decision making?
To begin to answer that question, Platt and Glimcherthe MFB is also activated but at a different frequency
and current. The rat must decide between these two (1999) developed a neurophysiological experiment
based loosely on foraging approaches like the onesoptions, allowing the experimenter to assess the rela-
tionship between the subjective value of the stimulation Krebs and Gallistel employed but in this case designed
to examine the neural substrate for visual-saccadic de-and the frequency and current of MFB activation. The
only drawback to this approach toward understanding cision making in rhesus monkeys (Figure 4). In that ex-
periment, thirsty monkeys were trained to stare straightthe value of MFB stimulation, however, is that one can
only rank order the values of the left and right levers. ahead at a central visual stimulus. After a delay, two
eccentric targets were illuminated, and the monkeysIn order to overcome that limitation, Gallistel and his
colleagues adjusted the dynamic structure of the re- had to choose whether to look at the left target, the
right target, or to abort the trial. The critical manipulationwards in the standard two-lever choice task in order to
extract, from the animal’s behavior, a precise estimate was that on sequential blocks of 100 trials the amount
of juice that the monkeys would earn for each of theof the exact value of any pattern of stimulation. To do
this, they adopted a strategy first pioneered for the study leftward and rightward movements was systematically
manipulated, and the animals’ decisions about whichof choice behavior in pigeons by Richard Herrnstein
(1961), in which each of the rat’s two levers was config- movement to make were recorded. Finally, while the
monkeys made decisions under these varying condi-ured so that the likelihood it would release a stimulation
train increased in proportion to the time since the lever tions, the activity of single neurons in parietal cortex
was studied to test the hypothesis that the relative profit-was last pressed (a variable interval schedule). Under
this regime, the left lever might, for example, become abilities of the leftward and rightward responses were
being represented within the neural architecture itself.enabled with an additive probability of 0.5 per second,
while the right lever might become enabled on any given The posterior parietal cortex was selected for examina-
tion, at least in part, because it was a major source ofsecond with a lower additive probability of 0.3. Impor-
tantly, once enabled, a lever remained enabled until the input to the frontal eye fields (FEF).
At a theoretical level, the problem that the monkeysreward was harvested by the rat. In a configuration like
this, during the first second of an experiment in which faced at the beginning of each block of 100 trials was
first to determine the relative profitability of both re-the two levers yield rewards of equal value but with
these different probabilities, the left lever is clearly more sponses. Once that had been accomplished, animals
might be expected to adopt an efficient foraging strat-profitable, and the rats should respond on it exclusively.
But after 3 s spent pressing the left lever, the right lever egy. They should, therefore, have produced each re-
sponse several times at the beginning of a new blockreaches a point at which it is now more likely to present
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controlled behavior in Fretwell’s model of multi-animal
foraging, but also with the actual moment-by-moment
probability matching behavior of the animals in which
these neurons resided. To a first approximation then,
the neuronal data seemed to suggest that computations
performed by the neural architecture for decision mak-
ing were at least related to computations that should
be the ultimate causes of decision-making behavior.
More recently, Gold and Shadlen (2000) have come
to a similar conclusion in a study of activity in the FEF
of monkeys during another kind of visual-saccadic deci-
sion-making task. In that experiment, monkeys were
trained to stare at a field of chaotically moving spots of
light. A small fraction of those spots, however, moved
coherently in a single direction, either to the right or to
the left. If the monkey reacted to this display by looking
in the direction that the small fraction of coherently drift-
ing spots were moving, he earned a juice reward. Gold
and Shadlen (2001) applied a formal decision theoretic
analysis to the problem the monkeys faced. They rea-
soned that when a large fraction of the spots were mov-
ing coherently the monkeys ought to be able to assess
the likelihood that a rightward movement would be re-
warded quite quickly. When only a tiny fraction of the
dots were moving coherently, the monkeys ought to
stare at the moving spots as long as possible to max-
imize the likelihood that they had correctly identified
the more profitable movement. If the decision-makingFigure 4. Platt and Glimcher Task and Unit Data
architecture reflects this calculation explicitly, then it
In Platt’s experiment, monkeys run blocks of trials in which they
should produce neural activity with a temporal profilemust decide whether to look left or right in order to obtain a fruit
which reflects a moment-by-moment estimate of thejuice reward. In sequential blocks, the relative values of the two
mathematical likelihood that a movement would be re-movements are manipulated. Neuronal firing rates in the lateral intra-
parietal area are strongly influenced by the relative value, to the warded.
animal, of the movement they encode. To test this hypothesis, Gold and Shadlen (2000) used
electrical stimulation in the FEF to trigger a saccade at
a variable interval after the moving spot display began.
and then settled on a strategy of producing only the
Under normal conditions, stimulation of the FEF elicits
more profitable response. Instead, Platt and Glimcher
a saccade having a fixed amplitude and direction, and
found that the monkeys typically matched their rates of
it was hoped that the temporal profile of the saccadic
responding during each block to the relative profitability decision process would be revealed as a systematic
of the two responses, as the rats had in Gallistel’s experi- deviation in the endpoint of the stimulation-induced
ments. In 1972, the behavioral ecologist Stephen Fret- movements. What they found was that the stimulation-
well developed a model for foraging under these circum- induced movements were indeed systematically biased
stances that might provide some insight into the ultimate and in a way that was correlated, at each point in time
cause of this apparently suboptimal behavior. Fretwell during the decision-making interval, with the theoreti-
noted that whenever animals forage in groups and have cally derived estimate of the likelihood that a given
to compete with each other for access to rewards of movement would be rewarded. Once again, the neurons
different values, probability matching of this type is al- seemed to be encoding a signal closely related to the
ways an optimal strategy. This raised the possibility that variables that an economically based model indicated
monkeys may probability match under many circum- should be the ultimate cause of the behavior.
stances because the neural computations that they per- Summary
form reflect an evolutionary assumption that they are Over the course of the last several decades, behavioral
competing with other monkeys. ecologists have repeatedly demonstrated that animals
In any case, while the animals were engaged in this often select between uncertain options of variable value
matching behavior, the activity of neurons in the eye in ways that are highly efficient; evolution appears to
movement control area of posterior parietal cortex was push animals toward efficient decision making within
assessed. Neurons associated with rightward move- their evolved niches. Behavioral ecologists have been
ments were, under these circumstances, found to carry able to show that models of optimal decision making
a signal which was highly correlated with the relative rooted in economic theory do a surprisingly good job
profitability of the rightward movement. Similarly, neu- of describing the computations that animals perform.
rons associated with leftward movements seemed to More recently, neurobiologists have begun to appro-
encode the relative profitability of the leftward move- priate this approach, using economic tools developed
ment. Essentially, the ratio of these two activities was for studying the ultimate evolutionary causes of behavior
for the examination of the neural architecture whichcorrelated not only with the relative profitabilities that
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serves as the proximal cause of that behavior. The stud- ducks in front of experimenter one realizes that it would
be more profitable to switch to experimenter two. Ofies presented here and literally dozens of other closely
related studies (see the other articles in this issue of course, if all of them switch to experimenter two, then
any duck remaining in front of experimenter one willNeuron) have begun to suggest that the explicit compu-
tations modeled by behavioral ecologists can be dis- profit enormously; as ducks shift toward experimenter
two, their actions alter the profitability of standing insected at a neuro-computational level.
In all of these cases, however, animals are decision front of experimenter one. Under these conditions, the
dynamic interactions of the ducks influence profitabilitymakers who must select and execute a rational course
of action in a passive world. The world is conceived of as much as does the rate at which breadballs are thrown.
What then is the optimal response under these condi-as presenting a fixed problem that the animal must solve.
While clearly valuable, studies of this kind may fail to tions?
The modern solution to this class of problem wasengage the richest and most complicated kind of deci-
sion making, the unpredictable or stochastic decisions developed by John Forbes Nash in the 1950s. Nash
recognized that under conditions like these the popula-that humans and animals make when faced with more
complicated environmental situations. tion as a group could be viewed as a dynamic system
which would ultimately reach a stable group solution, or
equilibrium, when the expected value of each resourceDynamic Conditions: The Theory of Games
patch was equivalent. The ducks would reach a groupIn the middle of the twentieth century, the mathemati-
equilibrium when and only when ten ducks stood beforecian John Von Neumann and the economist Oskar Mor-
experimenter two and 20 ducks stood before experi-genstern (Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944) be-
menter one, rendering the profitability of both patchescame interested in understanding when and how
1.5 g/m/duck (Nash, 1950a, 1950b; for a derivation spe-stochastic behavior, behavior in which humans behave
cifically with regard to foraging, see Fretwell, 1972).unpredictably, might be described as an efficient strat-
To make Nash’s insight clear, consider a case in whichegy for maximizing wealth. Von Neumann recognized
21 ducks stand momentarily in front of experimenterthat most economic problems which had been well de-
one and nine stand in front of experimenter two. Thescribed at that time involved straightforward optimiza-
population will reach a stable point most efficiently (andtion of the kind foraging theorists would later study. In
each duck will be guaranteed a maximal return assumingthose problems, the likelihoods and values of all possi-
all the other ducks behave rationally) if and only if in theble future outcomes are considered static variables in-
next moment each duck standing before experimentersensitive to the actions of the decision maker. What Von
one shows a 1 in 21 chance of shifting to experimenterNeumann realized was that problems of this type fail to
two. Each duck should behave stochastically but in acapture situations in which the profitability of a course
manner constrained by the ecological problem that theof action is influenced both by the actions of the decision
ducks face.maker and by the actions of intelligent opponents who
Harper’s experiment was critical because it testedmay themselves be influenced by the decision maker.
both the idea that the ducks could reach this kind ofConsider a famous experiment in behavioral ecology
stable Nash equilibrium and the notion that the ducksconducted by D.G.C. Harper in 1982 when a flock of
could behave unpredictably. When the experiment wasducks wintered on the main pond at the Cambridge
performed, it was found that the flock of 33 ducks as-University Botanical Garden (Harper, 1982). Each morn-
sorted themselves within as little as 90 s at a Nashing, two experimenters would walk to different banks of
equilibrium solution, precisely matching their behavioralthe pond, each with a sack of 5 g breadballs. At a signal,
distribution to the relative profitabilities of the two exper-they would both begin throwing the balls onto the
imenters as predicted by Nash’s (and Fretwell’s) equa-ground at a fixed rate: experimenter one throwing one
tions. If the experimenters then changed to new rates ofball every 10 s and experimenter two throwing one ball
breadball throwing, the ducks would immediately resortevery 20 s. To characterize this as a standard foraging
themselves, assuming the new equilibrium distributionproblem, imagine that 20 ducks are fixed in position in
in as little as 90 s. One thing that was particularly strikingfront of experimenter one and nine ducks are fixed in
about this result was the speed with which the ducksposition in front of experimenter two. A single free duck
achieved this assortment. After 90 s of breadball throw-who must choose between walking toward experi-
ing, as few as ten breadballs have been dispersed. Longmenter one or experimenter two should compute the
before half the ducks have obtained even a single bread-profitability, in grams of bread per minute, of each ac-
ball, they have produced a precise equilibrium solution.tion. Experimenter one provides a profitability of 30 g/
Harper also tested the game theoretic hypothesis de-min/20 ducks  1.5 g/m/duck. Experimenter two pro-
rived from other work (cf. Maynard Smith, 1982) thatvides a profitability of 15 g/min/9 ducks  1.67 g/m/
each duck should behave unpredictably on a moment-duck. The rational strategy under these conditions would
by-moment basis. Even when the flock was at a stablebe for the free duck to walk toward experimenter two.
equilibrium, Harper found that individual ducks wereWhat Von Neumann recognized when thinking about
constantly in motion. When the equilibria required thathuman decision making under similar conditions was
one third of the ducks stand in front of experimenterthat the situation becomes much more complicated
one, it was observed that each duck spent a randomwhen all the subjects (in our case, ducks) are free to
one third of its time standing in front of experimentermake this same decision at the same time. Imagine a
one. The behavior of individual ducks as they solvedsituation like the one above but in which each duck is
free to move. Under these conditions, each of the 20 this sensory motor problem was stochastic and unpre-
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game begins with the first player, who must decide
whether to terminate the game immediately, in which
case both players earn a 45 cent cash payoff, or whether
to turn control of the game over to player two. If control
passes to player 2, then player 2 must decide how to
split a much larger gain, 405 cents. Player two must
decide between taking all 405 cents for herself or keep-
ing only 225 and returning 180 to player one.
For a game theorist, this conflict is particularly inter-
esting when subjects face a new opponent on each trial.
Under those circumstances, if player two is perfectly
rational, given the chance, she will always take all 405
for herself. Cooperating with player one offers her no
advantage. Player one knows this and should, therefore,
always be compelled to end the game on the first play,
which guarantees her a small but at least positive out-
come. When players encounter each other repeatedly,
however, a different optimal strategy can emerge. The
two players can cooperate in fear of future retribution,
Figure 5. Extensive Form Game Tree for Trust and Reciprocity electing to trust one another in order to reach the 180/
In McCabe’s Trust and Reciprocity game, a round begins when 225 outcome on each play.
player one decides whether to end the game immediately or to pass Like more classical foraging examples, the trust and
control of the game to player two. If player one ends the game, both
reciprocity game examines a situation in which subjectsshe and player two receive 45 cents. If player one elects to trust
must decide between one of two possible responses.player two, then player two must decide how to divide a much larger
But unlike more classical examples, the optimal solutiongain. She can elect either to keep 405 cents of it for herself or to
reciprocate player one’s trust by turning 180 cents back to player depends upon assumptions both about the likelihood
one. McCabe and his colleagues found that humans were much of encountering the same player again and assumptions
more likely to trust or reciprocate with other humans than with about how one’s own behavior will influence the behav-
computer programs. Activity in an area of prefrontal cortex seemed
ior of the opponent. This is a property that defies expla-to be correlated with trusting and reciprocating.
nation with non-game theoretic tools and makes it simi-
lar in many ways to Harper’s duck experiment.
What McCabe and his colleagues found was that adictable at a local level but maintained the Nash equilib-
typical subject was very likely to cooperate with a humanrium globally.
opponent, even when she was told that she would face aHarper’s experiment suggests that, even when ani-
different opponent on subsequent trials. Humans turnedmals are dynamic and unpredictable, their behavior may
out to be more cooperative with other humans than was
still be described as the product of an evolutionary pro-
strictly rational, almost as if their brains were performing
cess that optimizes decision making. Thus, even sto-
a computation that assumed this opponent would,
chastic behavior may be ultimately caused by the envi-
sooner or later, be encountered again. However, when
ronmental constraints that drive evolution. Indeed, a subjects were told that they faced a computer opponent,
growing number of other studies support this conclu- they often took a different and more purely rational ap-
sion. For example, Craig Packer and his colleagues (cf. proach. They almost never cooperated. What McCabe
Packer and Ruttan, 1988; Packer et al., 1990) have and his colleagues found when studying the brains of
shown that the strategic behavior of lions who compete their subjects under these conditions was that whenever
within a pride can be well described using game theo- a subject chose to cooperate with a human opponent
retic approaches. Of course, the question that this raises a specific region in prefrontal cortex was more active
is whether game theoretic approaches which define the than when they decided to act rationally against the
ultimate causes of competitive and stochastic behav- computer. While this does not tell us too much about
ioral decisions can also be used to better understand how cooperativity is computed neurally, the McCabe
the neural substrates that serve as the proximal causes experiment is an important first step because it demon-
of these unpredictable behaviors. strates that game theoretic approaches can be used to
Game Theory and Neural Architectures study the neurobiological basis of stochastic decision
A number of researchers in economics and neurosci- making.
ence have recently begun to examine how the theory of Recognizing the significance of this strategy, two
games might be used to analyze the neural architecture other groups have also begun to explore game theoretic
active when competitive and stochastic behaviors are techniques for identifying variables that might be en-
produced. Kevin McCabe and colleagues (2001) pio- coded in the neural decision-making architecture. Dorris
neered this approach when they examined the brains and Glimcher (M.C. Dorris and P.G. Glimcher, 2001, Soc.
of human subjects engaged in a strategic game using Neurosci., abstract) have trained monkeys to participate
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). In their in a classic strategic conflict called the inspection game,
experiment, subjects played a game called trust and which is based loosely on Harper’s studies of foraging
reciprocity (Figure 5), in which two players, only one ducks. Ongoing studies of single neurons in the brains
of which is inside the scanner, work sequentially and of monkeys playing this game may well provide insight
into the computational architecture involved in the pro-interactively to earn money. The trust and reciprocity
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duction of stochastic behavior. In a similar vein, Berns examined and in much the same way that Horace Barlow
and colleagues (G.S. Berns et al., 2001, Soc. Neurosci., used information theory to describe efficient sensory
abstract) have begun to examine, using fMRI, the brains encoding.
of pairs of humans engaged in strategic interactions. In As neurobiologists begin to study the proximal causes
those experiments, two humans in two fMRI scanners of decision making, it seems imperative that these eco-
play a game classically called matching pennies while nomic approaches to behavior be employed as tools to
both are simultaneously scanned. These simultaneous bridge the gap between ultimate and proximal causes
studies may soon provide insight into the moment-by- of behavior. Just as the sensory physiologists of the last
moment interplays of neural activity that characterize century used models that were specifically designed to
stochastic decision making between pairs of subjects. describe efficient sensory encoding and discrimination,
Summary neurophysiologists interested in decision making must
In the 1950s and 60s, a number of neurophysiologists employ economic models specifically designed to de-
became interested in understanding how the sensory scribe the decision-making process. If the success of
systems of the brain encoded information about the the sensory physiologists during the last 50 years is any
outside world. One approach to this problem was to indication, models of decision making rooted in eco-
derive an estimate of how an optimally efficient sensory nomic theory should provide powerful insights into brain
system would operate. Behavioral tests then sought to function over the next half century.
determine the sensory efficiency of human and animal
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